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Abstract
We study network coordination problems, as captured by the setting of generalized net-
work design (Emek et al., STOC 2018), in the face of uncertainty resulting from partial
information that the network users hold regarding the actions of their peers. This uncer-
tainty is formalized using Alon et al.’s Bayesian ignorance framework (TCS 2012). While the
approach of Alon et al. is purely combinatorial, the current paper takes into account com-
putational considerations: Our main technical contribution is the development of (strongly)
polynomial time algorithms for local decision making in the face of Bayesian uncertainty.
Keywords: Bayesian competitive ratio, Bayesian ignorance, generalized network design, disec-
onomies of scale, energy consumption, smoothness, best response dynamics
1 Introduction
In real-life situations, network users are often required to coordinate actions for performance
optimization. This challenging coordination task becomes even harder in the face of uncertainty,
as users often act with partial information regarding their peers. Can users overcome their local
views and reach a good global outcome? How far would this outcome be from optimal?
For a formal treatment of the aforementioned questions, we adopt the Bayesian ignorance
framework of Alon et al. [4]. Consider N agents in a routing scenario, where each agent i ∈ [N ]
should decide on a (ui, vi)-path ai in the network with the objective of minimizing some global
cost function that depends on the links’ load. The (ui, vi) pair, also referred to as the type
of agent i, is drawn from a distribution pi. All agents know this distribution, but the actual
realization (ui, vi) of each agent i is only known to i herself.
Our goal is to construct a strategy for each agent i that determines her action ai based only
on her individual type (ui, vi). These strategies are computed in a “preprocessing stage” and the
actual decision making happens in real-time without further communication. We measure the
quality of a tuple of strategies in terms of its Bayesian competitive ratio (BCR) defined as the
ratio of the expected cost obtained by these strategies to that of an optimal solution computed
by an omnipotent algorithm (refer to Section 1.1.1 for the exact definition). To the best of our
knowledge, this algorithmic evaluation measure has not been studied so far.
∗An extended abstract of this paper is to appear in the 27th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms
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Our main technical contribution is a generic framework that yields strongly polynomial-time
algorithms constructing agent strategies with low BCR for Bayesian generalized network design
(BGND) problems — a setting that includes routing and many other network coordination
problems. Our framework assumes cost functions that exhibit diseconomy of scale (DoS) [5, 7,
28], capturing the power consumption of network devices that employ the popular speed scaling
technique.
1.1 Model
For clarity of the exposition, we start with the special case of Bayesian routing in Section 1.1.1
and then present the more general BGND setting in Section 1.1.2. Conceptually, the new
algorithmic problem of Bayesian routing that we define here is related to oblivious routing [21,
17, 36], where routing requests should be performed without any knowledge about actual network
traffic. This means that the routing path chosen for a routing request may only depend on the
network structure and the other parameters of the problem. Oblivious algorithms are attractive
as they can be implemented very efficiently in a distributed environment as they base routing
decisions only on local knowledge. As will become formally clear below, Bayesian routing has a
similar flavor, but with an important additional ingredient. We will assume that the algorithm
is equipped with statistical (“Bayesian”) knowledge about network traffic. Thus, in a sense, we
replace internal randomization techniques, that oblivious routing usually employs, with actual
data, while still being oblivious to other actual routing decisions and thus still maintaining the
locality principle.1
1.1.1 Special Case: Bayesian Routing
In the full information variant of the routing problem, we are given a (directed or undirected)
graph G = (V,E) and a set of N agents, where each agent i ∈ [N ] is associated with a node
pair (ui, vi) ∈ V × V , referred to as the (routing) request of agent i. This request should be
satisfied by choosing some (ui, vi)-path in G, referred to as the (feasible) action of agent i, and
the collection of all such paths is denoted by Ai.
Let A = A1 × · · · × AN be the collection of all action profiles. The load on edge e ∈ E
with respect to action profile a ∈ A, denoted by lae , is defined to be the number of agents whose
actions include e, that is, lae = |{i ∈ [N ] : e ∈ ai}|. The cost incurred by load l
a
e on edge e is
determined by an (edge specific) superadditive cost function Fe : R≥0 7→ R≥0 such that for any
l ≥ 0,
Fe(l) = ξe · l
α , (1)
where ξe > 0 (a.k.a. the speed scaling factor) is a parameter of edge e and α > 1 (a.k.a. the
load exponent) is a global constant parameter. Such a superadditive cost function captures,
for example, the power consumption of network devices employing the popular speed scaling
technique [38, 25, 8, 30, 13, 3] that allows the device to adapt its power level to its actual load.
In particular, for those network devices that employ the speed scaling technique, the value of α
generally satisfies 1 < α ≤ 3 [24, 37]. Another application of the cost function (1) with α = 2
is to model the queuing delay of users in a TCP/IP communication networks [18]. The goal in
the (full information) routing problem is to construct an action profile a ∈ A with the objective
of minimizing the total cost C(a) =
∑
e∈E Fe(l
a
e ).
Extending to Partial Information In the current paper, we extend the full information
routing problem to the Bayesian routing problem, where the request of agent i ∈ [N ] is not fully
known to all other agents. In this problem variant, agent i ∈ [N ] is associated with a set Ti of
1This is different from stochastic network design as these algorithms are not oblivious. More details are given
below.
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types so that each type ti ∈ Ti specifies its own routing request (u
ti
i , v
ti
i ) ∈ V × V . Let A
ti
i be
the set of all (feasible) actions for (the request of) type ti, namely, all (u
ti
i , v
ti
i )-paths in G and
let Ai =
⋃
ti∈Ti
Atii .
Agent i is also associated with a prior distribution pi over the types in Ti and the crux of
the Bayesian routing problem is that agent i should decide on her action while knowing the
realization of her own prior distribution pi (that is, the routing request she should satisfy) but
without knowing the realizations of the prior distributions of the other agents j 6= i. Formally,
let T = T1 × · · · × TN be the collection of type profiles and A = A1 × · · · ×AN be the collection
of action profiles. The set of (feasible) action profiles for a type profile t ∈ T is denoted by
At = At11 × · · · × A
tN
N and the prior distribution over the type profiles in T is denoted by p. In
this paper, p is assumed to be a product distribution, i.e., the probability of type profile t ∈ T
is p(t) =
∏N
i=1 pi(ti).
The goal in the Bayesian routing problem is to construct for each agent i ∈ [N ], a strategy
si : Ti 7→ Ai that maps agent i’s realized type ti ∈ Ti to an action ai ∈ A
ti
i . We emphasize that
the decision of agent i is taken irrespective of the other agents’ realized types which are not
(fully) known to agent i. Intuitively, a strategy si can be viewed as a lookup table constructed in
the “preprocessing stage”, and queried at real-time to determine a (fixed) path for every (ui, vi)
pair associated with i (cf. oblivious routing [31, 36]).
The set of strategies available for agent i is denoted by Si and S = S1 × · · · × SN denotes
the set of strategy profiles. For each type profile t ∈ T , the strategy profile s ∈ S determines an
action profile a = s(t) ∈ A defined so that ai = si(ti), i ∈ [N ]. Using this notation, the objective
in the Bayesian routing problem is to construct a strategy profile s ∈ S that minimizes the total
cost
C(s) = Et∼p
[∑
e∈E
Fe
(
ls(t)e
)]
.
Bayesian Competitive Ratio Consider an algorithm A that given a Bayesian routing in-
stance, constructs a strategy profile s. To evaluate the performance of A, we compare the total
cost C(s) to Et∼p[OPT(t)], where
OPT(t) = min
a∈At
∑
e∈E
Fe(l
a
e )
is the cost of an optimal action profile for the type profile t ∈ T . This can be regarded as the
expectation, over the same prior distribution p, of the total cost incurred by an omnipotent
algorithm that has a global view of the whole type profile t and enjoys unlimited computational
resources. The Bayesian competitive ratio (BCR) of algorithm A is the smallest β ≥ 1 such
that for every Bayesian routing instance, the strategy profile s constructed by A satisfies C(s) ≤
β · Et∼p[OPT(t)].
Alon et al. [4] introduced the related criterion of Bayesian ignorance defined as C(s
∗)
Et∼p[OPT(t)]
,
where s∗ = argmins∈S C(s) is an optimal strategy profile for the given instance. This criterion
quantifies the implication of the agents’ partial knowledge regarding the global system configura-
tion, irrespective of the computational complexity of constructing this optimal strategy profile.
By definition, for any strategy profile s ∈ S,
C(s) = Et∼p
[∑
e∈E
Fe
(
ls(t)e
)]
≥ Et∼p
[
min
a∈At
∑
e∈E
Fe(l
a
e )
]
which implies that the Bayesian ignorance is at least 1. Notice that the BCR is equivalent to
the product of the approximation ratio C(s)C(s∗) and the Bayesian ignorance, therefore it evaluates
the loss caused by both algorithmic (computational complexity) considerations and the absence
of the global information. The first contribution of the current paper is cast in the following
theorem.
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Theorem 1.1. For the Bayesian routing problem, there exists an algorithm whose BCR depends
only on the load exponent parameter α. This algorithm is fully combinatorial and runs in strongly
polynomial time.
We emphasize that the BCR of the algorithm promised in Theorem 1.1 is independent of
the number of agents N , the underlying graph G, the speed scaling factors ξe, e ∈ E, and the
probability distribution p. Therefore, as α is assumed to be a constant, so is the BCR.
1.1.2 Bayesian Generalized Network Design
Generalized Network Design The (full information) routing problem has recently been
generalized by Emek et al. [16] to the wider family of generalized network design (GND) prob-
lems. In its full information form (the form considered in [16]), a GND instance is defined over
N agents and a set E of resources. Each agent i ∈ [N ] is associated with an abstract (not nec-
essarily routing) request characterized by a set Ai ⊆ 2
E of (feasible) actions out of which , some
action ai ∈ Ai should be selected. As in the routing case, the action profile a = (a1, . . . , aN )
induces a load of lae = |{i ∈ [N ] : e ∈ ai}| on each resource e ∈ E that subsequently incurs
a cost of Fe(l
a
e ), where Fe : R≥0 7→ R≥0 is a resource specific cost function. The goal is to
construct an action profile a ∈ A = A1 × · · · × AN with the objective of minimizing the total
cost C(a) =
∑
e∈E Fe(l
a
e ).
The request of agent i ∈ [N ] is said to be succinctly represented [16] if its corresponding
action set Ai can be encoded using poly(|E|) bits. Identifying the resource set E with the edge
set of an underlying graph G, the routing requests defined in Section 1.1.1 are clearly succinctly
represented since each Ai corresponds to the set of (ui, vi)-paths in G, hence Ai can be encoded
by specifying ui and vi (and G). Other examples for succinctly represented requests, where the
resource set E is identified with the edge set of an underlying (directed or undirected) graph
G = (V,E), include:
• multi-routing requests in directed or undirected graphs, where given a collection Di ⊆
V × V of terminal pairs, the action set Ai consists of all edge subsets F ⊆ E such that
the subgraph (V, F ) admits a (u, v)-path for every (u, v) ∈ Di; and
• set connectivity (resp., set strong connectivity) in undirected (resp., directed) graphs, where
given a set Ti ⊆ V of terminals, the action set Ai consists of all edge subsets F ⊆ E that
induce on G a connected (resp., strongly connected) subgraph that spans Ti.
All requests mentioned (implicitly or explicitly) hereafter are assumed to be succinctly repre-
sented.
Bayesian GND In the current paper, we extend the (full information) GND setting to
Bayesian GND (BGND). This extension is analogous to the extension of full information routing
to Bayesian routing as defined in Section 1.1.1. In particular, agent i ∈ [N ] is now associated
with a set Ti of types, where each type ti ∈ Ti corresponds to a request whose action set is
denoted by Atii , and a prior distribution pi over the types in Ti. A strategy si of agent i is a
function that maps the agent’s realized type ti ∈ Ti to an action si(ti) ∈ A
ti
i .
Similarly to the notation introduced in Section 1.1.1, let T = T1 × · · · × TN be the set of
type profiles. Let Ai =
⋃
ti∈Ti
Atii and let A = A1 × · · · × AN be the set of action profiles. Let
Si be the set of strategies available for agent i and let S = S1 × · · · × SN be the set of strategy
profiles. Given a strategy profile s ∈ S and a type profile t ∈ T , let a = s(t) ∈ A be the action
profile defined so that ai = si(ti), i ∈ [N ]. The goal in the BGND problem is to construct a
strategy profile s ∈ S with the objective of minimizing the total cost
C(s) = Et∼p
[∑
e∈E
Fe
(
ls(t)e
)]
. (2)
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The BCR of Algorithm A is the smallest β ≥ 1 such that for every BGND instance, the strategy
profile s ∈ S constructed by A satisfies C(s) ≤ β · Et∼p[OPT(t)], where
OPT(t) = min
a∈At
∑
e∈E
Fe(l
a
e ) .
Generalized Cost Functions In addition to the generalization of (full information) routing
to GND, [16] also generalizes the cost functions defined in Eq. (1) to cost functions of the form
Fe(l) =
∑
j∈[q]
ξe,j · l
αj , (3)
where q is a positive integer, ξe,j is a positive real for every e ∈ E and j ∈ [q], and αj is a constant
real no smaller than 1 for every j ∈ [q].2 We define αmax = maxj∈[q] αj and assume hereafter
that αmax > 1. As discussed in [16], this generalization of Eq. (3) is not only interesting from a
theoretical perspective, but also makes the model more applicable to practical network energy
saving applications. Indeed, in realistic communication networks, a link often consists of several
different devices (e.g., transmitter/receiver, amplifier, adapter), all of which are operating when
the link is in use. As their energy consumption can vary in terms of the load exponents and
speed scaling factors [37], Eq. (3) may often provide a more accurate abstraction of the actual
link’s power consumption.
Action Oracles For a BGND problem P, this paper develops a framework which generates an
algorithm with BCR O(̺αmax) when provided with an action ̺-oracle for P. An action ̺-oracle
with parameter ̺ ≥ 1 for BGND problem P (cf. the reply ̺-oracles of [16]) is a procedure that
given agent i ∈ [N ], type ti ∈ Ti, and a weight vector w ∈ R
E
≥0, generates an action ai ∈ A
ti
i
such that
∑
e∈ai
w(e) ≤ ̺ ·
∑
e∈a′i
w(e) for any action a′i ∈ A
ti
i . An exact action oracle is an
action ̺-oracle with parameter ̺ = 1.
Notice that the optimization problem behind the action oracle is not a BGND problem: It
deals with a single type of a single agent and the role of the resource cost functions is now taken
by the weight vector. These differences often make it possible to implement the action oracle
with known (approximation) algorithms.
For example, the Bayesian routing problem, which requires paths between the given node
pairs, admit an exact action oracle implemented using, e.g., Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm
[15, 19]. In contrast, the BGND problem with set connectivity requests in undirected graphs
(P1), the BGND problem with set strong connectivity requests in directed graphs (P2), the
BGND problem with multi-routing requests in undirected graphs (P3), and the BGND problem
with multi-routing requests in directed graphs (P4) do not admit exact action oracles unless
P = NP as these would imply exact (efficient) algorithms for the Steiner tree, strongly connected
Steiner subgraph, Steiner forest, and directed Steiner forest problems, respectively. However,
employing known approximation algorithms for the latter (Steiner) problems, one concludes that
BGND problem (P1) admits an action ̺-oracle for ̺ ≤ 1.39 [10]; BGND problem (P2) admits an
action νǫ-oracle, where ν is the number of terminals [11]; BGND problem (P3) admits an action
2-oracle [1]; and BGND problem (P4) admits an action k1/2+ǫ-oracle, where k is the number
of terminal pairs [12]. This means, in particular, that BGND problems (P1) and (P3) always
admit an action ̺-oracle with a constant approximation ratio ̺, whereas BGND problems (P2)
and (P4) admit such an oracle when ν and k are fixed [1, 11, 12, 10]. The guarantees of our
approximation framework are cast in the following theorem.
2The cost functions considered in [16] have a fixed additional term, capturing the resource’s startup cost, that
makes them even more general. Due to technical difficulties, in the current paper we were not able to cope with
this additional term.
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Theorem 1.2. Consider a BGND problem P with an action ̺-oracle OP . When provided access
to OP , the framework proposed in this paper generates an algorithm AP whose BCR depends only
on the load exponent parameters α1, . . . , αq of Eq. (3). This framework is fully combinatorial and
runs in strongly polynomial time, hence if OP can be implemented to run in strongly polynomial
time, then so can AP .
Again, we emphasize that the BCR of the algorithm promised in Theorem 1.2 is independent
of the number of agents N , the number of resources |E|, the speed scaling factors ξe,j, j ∈ [q],
e ∈ E, and the probability distribution p. Therefore, as α1, . . . , αq are assumed to be constants,
so is the BCR. Since the Bayesian routing problem admits an exact action oracle, Theorem 1.1
follows trivially from Theorem 1.2. Throughout the remainder of this paper, we focus on the
BGND framework promised in Theorem 1.2.
1.2 Related Works
The technical framework that we use is inspired by [16]. Section 3 gives a detailed technical
overview including a full comparison.
In the full information case, network design problems with superadditive cost functions as
defined in Eq. (1) have been extensively studied with the motivation of improving the energy
efficiency of networks [5, 7, 28]. To the best of our knowledge, none of these studies has been
extended to the Bayesian case.
In the research works on oblivious routing (e.g., [17, 36, 27, 23]), the absence of global infor-
mation in routing is modeled in an adversarial (non-Bayesian) manner. In particular, oblivious
routing assumes that no knowledge about t−i is available when determining every ai, and the
performance of the algorithm is evaluated by means of its competitive ratio maxt∈T
∑
e∈E Fe(l
s(t)
e )
OPT(t) .
For the cost function Fe(l) = l
α with α > 1, Englert and Ra¨cke [17] propose an O(logα |V |)-
competitive oblivious routing algorithm for the scenario where the traffic requests are allowed
to be partitioned into fractional flows. Shi et al. [36] prove that for such a cost function, there
exists no oblivious routing algorithm with competitive ratio O
(
|E|
α−1
α+1
)
when it is required to
choose an integral path for every request.
The Bayesian approach is often used in the game theoretic literature to model the uncertainty
a player experiences regarding the actions taken by the other players. Roughgarden [33] studies a
routing game (among other things) in which the players share (equally) the cost of the edges they
use and proposes a theoretical tool called smoothness to analyze the price of anarchy (PoA) of
this game in a Bayesian setting, defined as
max
s∈SBNE
C(s)
Et∼p[OPT(t)]
, where SBNE denotes the set of Bayes-
Nash equilibria. In particular, he proves that with the cost function Fe(l) = ξe,1 · l+ ξe,2 · l
2, the
PoA is bounded by 52 . We employ the smoothness toolbox in our algorithmic construction, as
further described in Section 6 (see also the overview in Section 3).
Alon et al. [4] investigate the Bayesian routing game with a constant cost function Fe = ξe
and prove that the Bayesian ignorance C(s
∗)
Et∼p[OPT(t)]
is bounded by O(N) (resp., O(log |E|)) in
directed (resp., undirected) graphs G = (V,E). They also introduce game theoretic variants of
the Bayesian ignorance notion and analyze them in that game.
To deal with the inherent uncertainty of the demand in realistic networks, many research
works have been conducted on stochastic network design [22, 14, 32], formulated as a two-stage
stochastic optimization problem: in the first stage, each link in the network has a fixed cost and
the algorithm needs to make decisions to purchase links knowing the probability distribution over
the network demands; in the second stage, the network demands are realized (according to the
aforementioned probability distribution) and should be satisfied, which may require purchasing
additional links, this time with an inflated cost. The objective is to minimize the total cost of
the two stages plus a load dependent term, in expectation.
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The BGND setting considered in the current paper is different from two-stage stochastic
optimization (particularly, stochastic network design) in several aspects, the most significant
one is that in BGND, an agent’s strategy should dictate her “complete action” (e.g., a path for
routing requests) for every possible type, obliviously of the realized types of the other agents. In
particular, one cannot “update” the agents’ actions and purchase additional resources at a later
stage to satisfy the realized demands. Moreover, the current paper evaluates the performance of
a BGND algorithm by means of its BCR that takes into consideration computational complexity
limitations as well as the lack of global information (see Section 1.1) whereas the literature on
two-stage stochastic optimization typically evaluates algorithms using standard approximation
guarantees that accounts only for computational complexity limitations.
In [20], Garg et al. investigate online combinatorial optimization problems where the requests
arriving online are drawn independently and identically from a known distribution. As an exam-
ple, Garg et al. [20] study the online Steiner tree problem on an undirected graph G = (V,E).
In this problem, at each step the algorithm receives a terminal that is drawn independently
from a distribution over V , and needs to maintain a subset of edges connecting all the terminals
received so far.
Our work differs from [20] in following four aspects. First, in the stochastic online optimiza-
tion problem studied in [20], when each request i arrives, the previous requests {1, · · · , i − 1}
have been realized, and the realization is known. By contrast, in the BGND problem, every
agent i needs to be served without knowing the actual realization of the other agents. Second,
the cost function studied in [20] maps each resource e to a fixed toll, which is subaddtive in
the number of requests using e, while our cost function is superaddtive. Third, in the BGND
problem with the set connectivity requests, for each agent i, each type ti is a set of terminals
rather than a single terminal, and each action in Atii is a Steiner tree spanning over the set of
terminals corresponding to ti. Fourth, in the BGND problem, each prior distribution pi is over
the types of agent i, while there is no distribution over the agents.
1.3 Paper Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces some of the concepts em-
ployed in our approximation framework together with some notation and terminology. The main
challenges that we had to overcome when developing this framework and some of the techniques
used for that purpose are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 is dedicated to a detailed exposition
of our approximation framework. Its performance is then analyzed in Section 5 using certain
game theoretic properties which are investigated in Sections 6–8.
2 Preliminaries
We follow the common convention that for an N -tuple x = (x1, . . . , xN ) and for i ∈ [N ], the
notation x−i denotes the (N − 1)-tuple (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xN ). Likewise, for a Cartesian
product X = X1 × · · · ×XN and for i ∈ [N ], the notation X−i denotes the Cartesian product
X1 × · · · ×Xi−1 ×Xi+1 × · · · ×XN .
2.1 The BGND Game
Given an instance I =
〈
N,E, {Ti, pi}i∈[N ], {ξe,j}e∈E,j∈[q], {αj}j∈[q]
〉
of a BGND problem P, we
define a BGND game by associating every agent i ∈ [N ] with a strategic player who decides
on the strategy si with the objective of minimizing her own individual cost defined as follows.
Given an action profile a ∈ A and a resource e ∈ E, the corresponding cost Fe(l
a
e ) is equally
divided among the players i ∈ [N ] satisfying e ∈ ai; in other words, the cost share of player i in
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resource e under action profile a, denoted by fi,e(a), is defined to be
fi,e(a) =
{
0 , e /∈ ai
Fe(lae )
|i:e∈ai|
=
∑
j ξe,j (l
a
e )
αj−1 , otherwise
.
Informally, the individual cost of player i is the sum of her cost shares over all resources.
For a more formal treatment of the BGND game, we occasionally need to explicitly specify the
type ti of player i in the expressions involving her cost share in which case we use the notation
fi,e(ti; a), following the convention that fi,e(ti; a) = fi,e(a) if ai ∈ A
ti
i ; and fi,e(ti; a) = ∞
otherwise. The individual cost of a player i with respect to the type ti and a fixed action profile
a is defined as Ci(ti; a) =
∑
e∈E fi,e(ti; a). Correspondingly, for each player i ∈ [N ] and each
type ti ∈ Ti, we define the type-specified expected individual cost
Ci(ti; s) = Et−i∼p−i [Ci(ti; s(ti, t−i))] .
The objective function that player i wishes to minimize is her type-averaged expected individual
cost
Ci(s) = Eti∼pi [Ci(ti; s)] ,
irrespective of the total cost C(s), often referred to as the social cost.
Observation 2.1. The social cost satisfies C(s) =
∑
i∈[N ]Ci(s) for every strategy profile s ∈ S.
Let fi,e(ai; s−i) = Et−i∼p−i [fi,e(ai, s−i(t−i))] be the expected cost share of player i ∈ [N ] on
resource e ∈ E with respect to action ai ∈ Ai and strategy profile s−i ∈ S−i. Fixing a−i ∈ A−i
(resp., s−i ∈ S−i), the cost share fi,e(ai, a−i) (resp., expected cost share fi,e(ai; s−i)) of player
i on resource e is the same for every action ai ∈ Ai such that e ∈ ai. Therefore, it is often
convenient to ignore the specifics of action ai and use the notations fi,e(+, a−i) and fi,e(+; s−i)
instead of fi,e(ai, a−i) and fi,e(ai; s−i), respectively, given that e ∈ ai.
3
2.2 Definitions for the Algorithm Design and Analysis
The following definitions play key roles in the design and analysis of our approximation frame-
work.
Definition (Choice Function [33]). A choice function σ : T 7→ A maps every type profile t ∈ T
to an action profile a ∈ At. The action specified by σ for player i ∈ [N ] with respect to type
profile t is denoted by σi(t). In particular, the choice function that maps each type profile t to
an action profile that realizes OPT(t) is denoted by σ∗.
Definition (Smoothness [33]). Given parameters λ > 0 and 0 < µ < 1, a BGND game is said
to be (λ, µ)-smooth if∑
i∈[N ]
Ci(ti; (σ
∗
i (t), a−i)) ≤ λ · OPT(t) + µ ·
∑
i∈[N ]
Ci(t
′
i, a)
for every type profiles t, t′ ∈ T and action profile a ∈ At
′
.
Definition (Potential Function). A function Φ : S 7→ R≥0 is said to be a potential function of
the BGND game if
Φ(s)− Φ(s′i, s−i) = Ci(s)− Ci(s
′
i, s−i)
for every strategy profile s ∈ S, player i ∈ [N ], and strategy s′i ∈ Si. The potential function Φ(·)
is said to be K-bounded for a parameter K ≥ 1 if Φ(s) ≤ C(s) ≤ K · Φ(s) for every strategy
profile s ∈ S.
3To avoid ambiguity concerning the definition of fi,e(+, a−i) and fi,e(+; s−i) for resources e /∈ Ai, we assume
(in the scope of using these notations) that Ai = E for all i ∈ [N ]. This is without loss of generality as one can
augment Ti with a virtual type t˜i such that A
t˜i
i = {E} and pi(t˜i) is arbitrarily small.
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Definition ((η, η)-Estimation). Given real parameters η, η ≥ 1, a value x is said to be an
(η, η)-estimation of the expected cost share fi,e(ai; s−i) (resp., fi,e(+; s−i)) if it satisfies x/η ≤
fi,e(ai; s−i) ≤ x · η (resp., x/η ≤ fi,e(+; s−i) ≤ x · η). We typically denote this estimation x
by f̂i,e(ai; s−i) (resp., f̂i,e(+; s−i)). The BGND game is said to be poly-time (η, η)-estimable if for
every player i ∈ [N ] and strategy profile s−i ∈ S−i, there exists an algorithm which runs in time
poly(N, q, |T1|, · · · , |TN |) and outputs an (η, η)-estimation of the expected cost share fi,e(+; s−i).
The BGND game is said to be tractable if it is poly-time (η, η)-estimable with η = η = 1.
Fix some player i ∈ [N ], type ti ∈ Ti, and (η, η)-estimations f̂i,e(si(ti); s−i), e ∈ E. With
respect to these variables, let Ĉi(ti; s) =
∑
e∈E f̂i,e(si(ti); s−i) and Ĉi(s) = Eti∼pi [Ĉi(ti; s)]. By
the linearity of expectation, we know that
Ĉi(ti; s)/η ≤ Ci(ti; s) ≤ Ĉi(ti; s) · η and Ĉi(s)/η ≤ Ci(s) ≤ Ĉi(s) · η .
Consequently, we refer to Ĉi(ti; s) and Ĉi(s) as (η, η)-estimations of Ci(ti; s) and Ci(s), respec-
tively.
Definition (Approximate Best Response). For strategy profile s ∈ S and player i ∈ [N ],
strategy si ∈ Si is said to be an approximate best response (ABR) of i with approximation
parameter χ ≥ 1 if Ci(si, s−i) ≤ χ · Ci(s
′
i, s−i) holds for any s
′
i ∈ Si. We may omit the explicit
mention of the approximation parameter χ when it is clear from the context. A best response
(BR) is an ABR with approximation parameter χ = 1.
Definition (Approximate Best Response Dynamics). An approximate best response dynamic
(ABRD) is a procedure that starts from a predetermined strategy profile s0 ∈ S and generates
a series of strategy profiles s1, · · · , sR such that for every 1 ≤ r ≤ R, there exists some player
i ∈ [N ] satisfying (1) sr−i = s
r−1
−i ; and (2) s
r
i is an ABR of i to s
r−1
−i .
3 Overview of the Main Challenges and Techniques
The approximation framework presented in Section 4 for BGND problems is inspired by the
framework designed in [16] for full information GND problems only in the conceptual sense
that both algorithms employ approximate best response dynamics. In a high-level, for a certain
number R of rounds that will be carefully chosen in order to achieve the approximation promise,
and starting from some properly chosen initial strategy profile s0, for each round 1 ≤ r ≤ R the
strategy profile sr is generated from sr−1 in the following manner:
1. For every player i ∈ [N ] and resource e ∈ E, compute an (η, η)-estimation f̂i,e(+; s
r−1
−i ) of
the expected cost share fi,e(+; s
r−1
−i ).
2. For every player i ∈ [N ], construct the strategy s′i by mapping each type ti ∈ Ti to the
action ai ∈ A
ti
i computed by invoking the action ̺-oracle with weight vector w defined by
setting w(e) = f̂i,e(+; s
r−1
−i ).
3. Choose player i ∈ [N ] according to the game theoretic criterion presented in Section 4 re-
garding the estimations Ĉi(s
r−1) and Ĉi(s
′
i, s
r−1
−i ) of the type-averaged expected individual
costs. Construct sr by updating the strategy of the chosen player i to s′i.
However, beyond the similar high-level structure, the technical construction in this paper
is entirely different from [16] since the incomplete information assumption of the BGND set-
ting exhibits new algorithmic challenges that require novel techniques. Specifically, the main
challenges that our technical analysis in this paper handles are as follows.
A first obstacle here is the difficulty in computing the estimation f̂i,e(+; s
r−1
−i ) =
Et−i∼p−i [fi,e(+, s−i(t−i))] in step 1 since there are exponentially (in N) many possibilities for
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t−i. Another source of difficulty in this regard is that the function fi,e(+, s−i(t−i)) is nonlinear in
l
s−i(t−i)
e . One may hope that Jensen’s inequality [26] can resolve this issue, however, as we explain
in the technical sections, it is not enough for obtaining proper bounds on both η and η. This ob-
stacle is addressed in Section 8 where we employ probabilistic tools from [9] and using Cantelli’s
inequality [35] to obtain the required estimation of the expression Et−i∼p−i [fi,e(+, s−i(t−i))].
A second obstacle is that the ABRD-based approximation framework expresses its approx-
imation guarantees in terms of smoothness parameters and bounded potential functions. How-
ever, neither the smoothness parameters nor the existence of a bounded potential function are
known for the BGND game that we have defined here. We provide a new analysis for these two
issues in Sections 6 and 7, respectively.
A third obstacle involves the stopping condition of the best response dynamics. A stopping
condition for the full information case, via the smoothness framework, was developed by [34]
(showing that if the current outcome in a best response dynamics is far from optimal there must
exist a player whose best response significantly improves his own utility). For the Bayesian case,
to the best of our knowledge, no such general stopping condition was known prior to the current
paper. In fact, the smoothness framework for the Bayesian case which was developed in [33]
did not include any results on best response dynamics. One specific technical difficulty is that
Bayesian smoothness is defined in [33] w.r.t. a deviation to the optimal choice function rather
than to a best response. This obstacle is resolved in Section 5 where we provide such a stopping
condition by proving that if the outcome of the current step of the ABRD in the Bayesian case is
far from optimal, there must exist a player whose approximate best response must significantly
improve her utility.
A fourth obstacle regards the output of the algorithm, once the ABRD terminates. Although
we prove that there exists at least one strategy profile sr, 1 ≤ r ≤ R, with a sufficiently small
social cost C(sr), we do not know how to find it. In particular, we wish to emphasize that we
cannot simply evaluate the social cost function C(·) (see Eq. (2)) due to the exponential number
of type profiles. This obstacle does not exist in [16] where they can explicitly go over all steps of
the full information ABRD and find the exact step whose outcome has minimal cost. To resolve
this issue, we output the last strategy profile sR generated in the ABRD and bound its loss.
This is described in Section 5.
Our technical constructions and our analysis employ various techniques from algorithmic
game theory, demonstrating once again (as in [16]) the usefulness of this literature as a toolbox
for algorithmic constructions that, on the face of it, have nothing to do with selfish agents. In
particular, in this paper (and as assumed in the literature on oblivious routing [21, 17, 36]), we
construct an algorithm that receives a correct input and outputs routing tables that the agents
are going to follow without issues of selfish deviations.
4 The Algorithm
In this part, we present an algorithm, which is referred to as Bayes-ABRD, for a given BGND
problem P. The algorithm is assumed to have free access to an action ̺-oracle for P, which is
denoted by OP .
With an input instance I =
〈
N,E, {Ti, pi}i∈[N ], {ξe,j}e∈E,j∈[q], {αj}j∈[q]
〉
, the first step of
the algorithm is to (conceptually) construct a BGND game, and choose a tuple of parameters
(λ, µ,K, η, η) such that the BGND game
1. is (λ, µ)-smooth with ̺(ηη)2µ < 1,
2. has a potential function Φ that is K-bounded,
3. is poly-time (η, η)-estimable.
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The existence and exact values of the parameters in this tuple are presented in the following
sections. In particular, the smoothness parameters (λ, µ) are analyzed in Section 6, the potential
function is established in Section 7, and the estimation parameters (η, η) are specified in Section
8.
Lemma 4.1. For any i ∈ [N ] and any s−i ∈ S−i, there exists a poly(|E|, N, q, {|Ti|}i∈[N ])-time
procedure which generates a strategy si ∈ Si and the corresponding (η, η)-estimation Ĉi(si, s−i)
of the individual costs such that Ĉi(si, s−i) ≤ ̺ · η · Ci(s
′
i, s−i) for any s
′
i ∈ Si. This means in
particular that si is an ABR of i to s−i with approximation parameter ̺ · ηη.
4
Proof. For each player i ∈ [N ], construct the weight vector wi,s−i : E → R≥0 by setting wi,s−i(e)
to be the (η, η)-estimation f̂i,e(+; s−i) of the expected share. This weight vector can be obtained
in time poly(|E|, N, q, {|Ti|}i∈[N ]) since the BGND game is poly-time (η, η)-estimable. By defi-
nition, for any action a′i ∈ Ai satisfying e ∈ a
′
i, it holds that fi,e(a
′
i; s−i) = fi,e(+; s−i). It implies
that wi,s−i(e) can be taken as an (η, η)-estimation f̂i,e(a
′
i; s−i) of the expected share fi,e(a
′
i; s−i).
Then, through accessing the action ̺-oracle OP for each type ti ∈ Ti, a strategy si can be
found such that for any strategy s′i ∈ Si,∑
e∈E
f̂i,e(si(ti); s−i) =
∑
e∈si(ti)
wi,s−i(e) ≤ ̺ ·
∑
e∈s′i(ti)
wi,s−i(e) ≤ ̺ · η
∑
e∈E
fi,e(s
′
i(ti); s−i) ,
which means that Ĉi(ti; (si, s−i)) ≤ ̺ · η · Ci(ti; (s
′
i, s−i)).
By the linearity of the expectation,
∑
ti∈Ti
pi(ti)
∑
e∈si(ti)
wi,s−i(e) gives the desired (η, η)-
estimation Ĉi(si, s−i), and for any s
′
i ∈ Si, it holds that
Ĉi(si, s−i) =
∑
ti∈Ti
pi(ti) · Ĉi(ti; (si, s−i)) ≤ ̺η
∑
ti∈Ti
pi(ti) · Ci(ti; (s
′
i, s−i)) ≤ ̺ηCi(s
′
i, s−i) .
Employing the procedure promised by Lemma 4.1, Bayes-ABRD simulates an ABRD of at
most R rounds s0, s1, . . . for the BGND game induced by I. Here R is a positive integer
depending on the tuple (λ, µ,K, η, η), and its exact value is also deferred to the following parts
(Section 5). The ABRD simulated in our algorithm is done as follows.
Each player i chooses her initial strategy s0i by taking each s
0
i (ti) to be the action generated
by OP for type ti with respect to the weight vector w
0 defined by setting w0(e) =
∑
j∈[q] ξe,j,
that is, as if i is playing alone. The obtained strategy s0i is broadcast by player i to all the other
players such that the full strategy profile s0 is known by every player. Assuming that sr−1,
1 ≤ r ≤ R, was already constructed and known by all the players, sr is obtained as follows.
Every player i ∈ [N ] employs the procedure promised by Lemma 4.1 to generate an ABR ŝ r−1i
to sr−1−i , and computes ∆
r
i = Ĉi(s
r−1) − (ηη) · Ĉi(ŝ
r−1
i , s
r−1
−i ). Both the strategy ŝ
r−1
i and the
value ∆ri are broadcast to all the other players. If ∆
r
i ≤ 0 for all i ∈ [N ], then the ABRD stops,
and every player i sets sri = s
r−1
i ; in this case, we say that the ABRD converges. Otherwise, fix
∆r =
∑
i∈[N ]∆
r
i and choose some player i
′ ∈ [N ] so that
∆ri′ > 0 and ∆
r
i′ ≥
1
N
∆r (4)
to update her strategy, setting sr = (ŝ r−1i′ , s
r−1
−i′ ) (the existence of such a player is guaranteed
by the pigeonhole principle, and ties are always broken by choosing the player with the smallest
4All subsequent occurrences of the term ABR (and ABRD) share the same approximation parameter ̺ηη,
hence we may refrain from mentioning this parameter explicitly.
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index). Such an update can be performed by each player in a distributed manner, as every
player has the knowledge of the full vectors {sri }i∈[N ] and {∆
r
i }i∈[N ].
When the ABRD terminates (either because it has reached round r = R or because it
converges), Bayes-ABRD outputs the strategy generated in the last round.
Remark 4.2. Note that Bayes-ABRD is designed for computing the strategy profile, not for
invoking the strategies to decide the actions in real-time. All the operations of Bayes-ABRD,
including broadcasting the strategy ŝ r−1i and the value ∆
r
i for every player i in every round
r ∈ [R], are carried out in a “precomputing stage” without seeing the realized type profile. The
decision making that happens in real-time does not involve any further communication.
5 Bounding the BCR with Game Theoretic Parameters
Lemma 5.1. For every player i and every strategy profile s, if s′i is the BR of i to s, then
Ci
(
ti; (s
′
i, s−i)
)
≤ Et−i∼p−i
[
Ci
(
ti; (ai, s−i(t−i))
)]
holds for every type ti and every action ai ∈ A
ti
i .
Proof. Suppose that there exists a type t′i and an action a
′
i ∈ A
t′i
i such that Ci
(
ti; (s
′
i, s−i)
)
>
Et−i∼p−i
[
Ci
(
ti; (ai, s−i(t−i))
)]
. Now construct a new strategy s′′i of player i which maps every
type ti 6= t
′
i to the same action as s
′
i, and maps t
′
i to a
′
i. Then
Ci(s
′′
i , s−i) = Eti∼pi
[
Ci
(
ti; (s
′′
i , s−i)
)]
=
∑
ti 6=t′i
pi(ti)Ci
(
ti; (s
′′
i , s−i)
)
+ pi(t
′
i)Et−i∼p−i
[
Ci
(
ti; (ai, s−i(t−i))
)]
<
∑
ti 6=t′i
pi(ti)Ci
(
ti; (s
′′
i , s−i)
)
+ pi(t
′
i)Ci(t
′
i, (s
′
i, s−i)) = Ci(s
′
i, s−i) ,
which conflicts with the assumption that s′i is the BR of i to s.
Lemma 5.2. For a BGND game that is (λ, µ)-smooth with λ > 0 and 0 < µ < 1
̺(ηη)2
and every
strategy profile s, let s′i be the BR of each player i to s, then∑
i∈[N ]
Ci(s
′
i, s−i) ≤ λ · Et∈T [OPT(t)] + µ · C(s) .
Proof. For every fixed t′−i ∈ T−i, Lemma 5.1 indicates that for every i, every ti, and every
t′−i ∈ T−i,
Ci(ti; (s
′
i, s−i)) ≤ Et−i∼p−i
[
Ci
(
ti; (σ
∗
i (ti, t
′
−i), s−i(t−i))
)]
,
because the action σ∗i (ti, t
′
−i) does not depend on t−i. Taking the expectation over ti, we get∑
i∈[N ]
Ci(s
′
i, s−i) =
∑
i∈[N ]
Eti∼pi
[
Ci(ti; (s
′
i, s−i))
]
≤
∑
i∈[N ]
Eti∼pi
[
Et−i∼p−i
[
Ci
(
ti; (σ
∗
i (ti, t
′
−i), s−i(t−i))
)]]
=
∑
i∈[N ]
Et∼p
[
Ci
(
ti; (σ
∗
i (ti, t
′
−i), s−i(t−i))
)]
.
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The last transition holds because the prior distribution p is assumed to be a product distribution.
Since the formula above holds for every t′−i ∈ T−i, it can be derived from the definition of
expectation that∑
i∈[N ]
Ci(s
′
i, s−i) ≤ Et′−i∼p−i
[ ∑
i∈[N ]
Et∼p
[
Ci
(
ti; (σ
∗
i (ti, t
′
−i), s−i(t−i))
)]]
=
∑
i∈[N ]
Et∼p
[
Et′−i∼p−i
[
Ci
(
ti;
(
σ∗i (ti, t
′
−i), s−i(t−i)
))]]
.
The last transition holds because t′−i is independent of t. In [33], it is proved that in a BGND
game that is (λ, µ)-smooth, it holds for any strategy profile s that∑
i∈[N ]
Et∼p
[
Et′−i∼p−i
[
Ci
(
ti;
(
σ∗i (ti, t
′
−i), s−i(t−i)
))]]
≤ λ · Et∼p [OPT(t)] + µ · C(s) .
Since µ < 1
̺(ηη)2
≤ 1, this proposition follows.
Lemma 5.3. If the ABRD simulated in Bayes-ABRD converges at round r for any r ∈ [R], then
the last strategy profile sr satisfies
C(sr) ≤
̺(ηη)2λ
1− ̺(ηη)2µ
· Et∼T
[
OPT(t)
]
.
Proof. Recalling that we use s′i and ŝ
r
i to respectively represent the BR and ABR of player i to
sr, we observe that
C(sr) =
∑
i
Ci(s
r) ≤ η
∑
i
Ĉi(s
r)
≤ η(ηη)
∑
i
Ĉi(ŝ
r
i , s
r
−i)
≤ ̺(ηη)2 ·
∑
i
Ci(s
′
i, s
r
−i)
≤ ̺(ηη)2(λ · Et∼T
[
OPT(t)
]
+ µ · C(sr)) ,
where the second transitions follow from the definition of the (η, η)-estimation of the individual
cost, the third transition holds since the ABRD converges at round r, the fourth transition holds
following Lemma 4.1, and the fifth transition follows from Lemma 5.2.
Lemma 5.4. The initial strategy profile s0 of Bayes-ABRD satisfies C(s0) ≤ ̺ · Nαmax−1 ·
Et∼T
[
OPT(t)
]
.
Proof. The construction of s0 guarantees that∑
e∈s0i (ti)
∑
j∈[q]
ξe,j ≤ ̺ ·
∑
e∈σ∗i (ti,t−i)
∑
j∈[q]
ξe,j
holds for any i, any ti, and any t−i. It implies that,∑
i∈[N ]
∑
e∈s0i (ti)
∑
j∈[q]
ξe,j ≤ ̺ ·
∑
i∈[N ]
∑
e∈σ∗i (ti,t−i)
∑
j∈[q]
ξe,j
≤ ̺ ·
∑
i∈[N ]
∑
e∈σ∗i (ti,t−i)
∑
j∈[q]
ξe,j
(
l
σ∗(ti,t−i)
e
)αj−1
= ̺ · OPT(ti, t−i) ,
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where the second transition holds because l
σ∗(t)
e ∈ Z≥1 for any e ∈ σ
∗
i (t), and αj − 1 ≥ 0. Then,
C(s0) =Et∼T
[∑
e∈E
∑
j∈[q]
ξe,j
(
ls
0(t)
e
)αj]
=Et∼T
[∑
e∈E
∑
i:e∈s0i (ti)
∑
j∈[q]
ξe,j
(
ls
0(t)
e
)αj−1]
≤Et∼T
[∑
e∈E
∑
i:e∈s0i (ti)
∑
j∈[q]
ξe,j ·N
αj−1
]
≤Nαmax−1Et∼T
[∑
e∈E
∑
i:e∈s0i (ti)
∑
j∈[q]
ξe,j
]
=Nαmax−1Et∼T
[ ∑
i∈[N ]
∑
e∈s0i (ti)
∑
j∈[q]
ξe,j
]
≤ ̺Nαmax−1 · Et∼T
[
OPT(t)
]
.
The assertion follows.
Lemma 5.5. For any round r < R such that the ABRD does not converge at round r + 1, as
long as the player selected for strategy update satisfies Eq. (4), we have Φ(sr)− Φ(sr+1) > 0.
Proof. Since the ABRD does not converge at round r, there exists a player ir who is selected to
update her strategy. By the definition of the potential function,
Φ(sr)− Φ(sr+1) = Cir(s
r)− Cir(ŝ
r
ir , s
r
−ir)
≥
1
η
Ĉir(s
r)− ηĈir(ŝ
r
ir , s
r
−ir)
>
1
η
(ηη)Ĉir(ŝ
r
ir , s
r
−ir)− ηĈir(ŝ
r
i r , s
r
−ir)
= 0 .
The second formula follows from the definition of the ǫ-individual cost. The third one follows
from Eq. (4).
Theorem 5.6. Let Q =
2(ηη)N
1−̺(ηη)2µ
. If R =
⌈
Q · ln
(
KNαmax−1
)⌉
, then the output sout of
Bayes-ABRD satisfies
C(sout) ≤
2K̺(ηη)2λ
1− ̺(ηη)2µ
· Et∼T
[
OPT(t)
]
.
Proof. Lemma 5.3 ensures that the assertion holds if the ABRD simulated in Bayes-ABRD con-
verges in any round r ≤ R, so it is left to analyze the case where the ABRD does not converge.
We say a profile sr involved in the ABRD is bad if
C(sr) >
2̺(ηη)2λ
1− ̺(ηη)2µ
· Et∼T
[
OPT(t)
]
.
Claim 5.7. For any r < R, if sr is bad, then Φ(sr+1) < (1− 1/Q) · Φ(sr).
Proof. Fix
dr = η
[ ∑
i∈[N ]
Ĉi(s
r)− (ηη)
∑
i∈[N ]
Ĉi(ŝ
r
i , s
r
−i)
]
. (5)
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This means that
C(sr) =
∑
i∈[N ]
Ci(s
r) ≤ η
∑
i∈[N ]
Ĉi(s
r)
= η(ηη)
∑
i∈[N ]
Ĉi(ŝ
r
i , s
r
−i) + d
r
≤ ̺(ηη)2
∑
i∈[N ]
Ci(s
′
i, s
r
−i) + d
r
≤ ̺(ηη)2
(
λ · Et∼T
[
OPT(t)
]
+ µC(sr)
)
+ dr .
Therefore, dr ≥
[
1− ̺(ηη)2µ
]
C(sr)−̺(ηη)2λ·Et∼T
[
OPT(t)
]
, hence, if sr is bad, then dr satisfies
dr >
[
1− ̺(ηη)2µ
]
C(sr)−
1− ̺(ηη)2µ
2
C(sr) =
1− ̺(ηη)2µ
2
C(sr) . (6)
Since the ABRD does not converge at round r, there exists a player ir being selected to
update her strategy. Recalling that the ABR of player i to sr is denoted by ŝ ri , we observe that
Φ(sr)− Φ(sr+1) = Cir(s
r)−Cir(ŝ
r
ir , s
r
−ir)
≥
1
η
Ĉir(s
r)− η · Ĉir(ŝ
r
ir , s
r
−ir)
=
1
η
[
Ĉir(s
r)− (ηη)Ĉir(ŝ
r
ir , s
r
−ir)
]
≥
1
η
·
1
N
∑
i∈[N ]
[
Ĉi(s
r)− (ηη)Ĉi(ŝ
r
i , s
r
−i)
]
=
1
ηη
·
dr
N
>
1
ηη
·
1
2N
[
1− ̺(ηη)2µ
]
C(sr)
≥
1
ηη
·
1
2N
[
1− ̺(ηη)2µ
]
Φ(sr) ,
where the fourth transition follows from Eq. (4), the fifth and sixth transitions follow from
Eq. (5) and Eq. (6), respectively, and the last transition holds because the potential function is
assumed to be K-bounded. Therefore,
Φ(sr+1) < Φ(sr)
(
1−
1− ̺(ηη)2µ
2(ηη)N
)
= (1− 1/Q) · Φ(sr)
as promised.  (Claim 5.7)
Claim 5.8. Assuming that all the R+1 strategy profiles in the ABRD are bad, we have C(sR) <
̺ · Et∼T
[
OPT(t)
]
.
Proof. Claim 5.7 implies that if all the R+ 1 profiles involved in the ABRD are bad, then
Φ(sR) <
(
1−
1
Q
)R
Φ(s0) =
(
1−
1
Q
)⌈Q·ln(KNαmax−1)⌉
Φ(s0) ≤
1
KNαmax−1
Φ(s0) .
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By the definition of the bounded potential function and by Lemma 5.4, we have
C(sR) ≤ K · Φ(sR) <
KΦ(s0)
KNαmax−1
≤
C(s0)
Nαmax−1
≤
̺Nαmax−1Et∼T
[
OPT(t)
]
Nαmax−1
,
which completes the proof.  (Claim 5.8)
Claim 5.9. ̺ <
2̺(ηη)2λ
1−̺(ηη)2µ
.
Proof. It can be inferred from [33] that the parameters (λ, µ) should satisfy λ1−µ ≥ 1 if the game
is (λ, µ)-smooth. Therefore,
2̺(ηη)2λ
1−̺(ηη)2µ
> 2̺λ1−µ > ̺.  (Claim 5.9)
By Claim 5.9 and the definition of bad strategy profiles, C(sR) < ̺ · Et∼T
[
OPT(t)
]
implies
that sR is not bad, which conflicts with the assumption of Claim 5.8 that all the R+1 strategy
profiles are bad. This means that there exists at least one round r∗ whose corresponding strategy
profile sr
∗
is not bad. Therefore,
C(sR) ≤ K · Φ(sR) ≤ K · Φ(sr
∗
) ≤ K · C(sr
∗
) ≤ K ·
2̺(ηη)2λ
1− ̺(ηη)2µ
· Et∼T
[
OPT(t)
]
.
The first transition and the third one holds because the potential function is K-bounded. The
second transition follows from Lemma 5.5. The last transition holds because sr
∗
is not bad.
This completes the proof.
6 Smoothness Parameters
In this section, we consider the case where the parameters ̺, η and η are fixed, and focus on
finding proper parameters (λ, µ) such that the BGND game is (λ, µ)-smooth, and µ < 1/[̺(ηη)2].
Lemma 6.1. For any pair of parameters λ′ > 0 and 0 < µ′ < 1
/[
̺
(
ηη
)2]
, if
y · (x+ y)αj−1 ≤ λ′ · yαj + µ′ · xαj (7)
holds for any x, y ∈ R≥0 and every j ∈ [q], then the BGND game is (λ
′, µ′)-smooth.
Proof. This proposition can be proved in a similar way as [33]. For any resource e and any type
t, we say e ∈ σ∗(t) if there exists some player i such that e ∈ σ∗i (t). For any type profiles t, t
′,
every action profile a ∈ At
′
, and every resource e ∈ σ∗(t),∑
i∈[N ]
fi,e(ti; (σ
∗
i (t), a−i)) =
∑
i∈[N ]:e∈σ∗i (t)
∑
j∈[q]
ξe,j
(
l
(σ∗i (t),a−i)
e
)αj−1
≤ |lσ
∗(t)
e |
∑
j∈[q]
ξe,j
(
lσ
∗(t)
e + l
a
e
)αj−1
≤
∑
j∈[q]
ξe,j
[
λ′ ·
(
lσ
∗(t)
e
)αj
+ µ′ ·
(
lae
)αj]
,
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where the third transition follows from Eq. (7). Then∑
i∈[N ]
Ci(ti; (σ
∗
i (t), a−i)) =
∑
i∈[N ]
∑
e∈E
fi,e(ti; (σ
∗
i (t), a−i))
=
∑
e∈σ∗(t)
∑
i∈[N ]
fi,e(ti; (σ
∗
i (t), a−i))
≤ λ′ ·
∑
e∈σ∗(t)
∑
j∈[q]
ξe,j
(
lσ
∗(t)
e
)αj
+ µ′ ·
∑
e∈σ∗(t)
∑
j∈[q]
ξe,j
(
lae
)αj
≤ λ′ · OPT(t) + µ′ ·
∑
i∈[N ]
Ci(t
′
i, a) .
The second transition above holds because for any e /∈ σ∗(t), fi,e(ti; (σ
∗
i (t), a−i)) = 0 for ev-
ery player i. The last transition holds because lae = 0 for any e /∈ a, which implies that∑
e∈σ∗(t)
∑
j∈[q] ξe,j
(
lae
)αj
=
∑
e∈σ∗(t)∩a
∑
j∈[q] ξe,j
(
lae
)αj
.
Lemma 6.2 ([2]). For any µ′ ∈ (0, 1
̺(ηη)2
), setting λ′ = maxx∈R>0(x + 1)
αmax−1 − µ′ · xαmax
satisfies Eq. (7).
For any µ′ ∈ (0, 1
̺(ηη)2
), define gµ′(x) = (x+1)
αmax−1−µ′ ·xαmax and h(x) =
[
(αmax−1)(x+
1)αmax−2
]/[
αmax · x
αmax−1
]
. Then:
Lemma 6.3 ([2]). For any µ′ ∈ (0, 1
̺(ηη)2
), there exists a unique real positive number xµ′ that
maximizes gµ′(x) over x ∈ (0,+∞), and this number satisfies hαmax(xµ′) = µ
′.
Remark 6.4. Note that in [2], the propositions corresponding to Lemma 6.2 and Lemma 6.3 are
proved for the case αmax ∈ Z≥2, but their proofs directly hold for the case where αmax ∈ R≥1.
It can be inferred from the derivative that (x + 1)αmax−1 = xαmax has a unique positive
root, which is denoted by γαmax . In [2], it is proved that if αmax ≥ 3, γαmax is bounded by
O
(
αmax−1
ln(αmax−1)
)
. Furthermore, it can be verified that γαmax < 2 when αmax ∈ (1, 2), and γαmax < 3
when αmax ∈ [2, 3).
Let µα = h
(
̺(ηη)2 · γαmax
)
, and λα = gµα
(
̺(ηη)2 · γαmax
)
. Then we have:
Theorem 6.5. The BGND game is (λα, µα)-smooth, and ̺(ηη)
2µα < 1− 1/αmax.
Proof.
h
(
̺(ηη)2 · γαmax
)
=
(αmax − 1) ·
(
̺(ηη)2 · γαmax + 1
)αmax−2
αmax ·
(
̺(ηη)2 · γαmax
)αmax−1
=
(αmax − 1) ·
(
̺(ηη)2 · γαmax + 1
)αmax−1(
̺(ηη)2 · γαmax
)
αmax ·
(
̺(ηη)2 · γαmax
)αmax(
̺(ηη)2 · γαmax + 1
)
=
(αmax − 1)
(
̺(ηη)2 · γαmax + 1
)αmax−1(
̺(ηη)2 · γαmax
)
αmax̺(ηη)2
[
̺(ηη)2 ·
(
γαmax + 1
)]αmax−1(
̺(ηη)2 · γαmax + 1
)
<
(αmax − 1)
αmax̺(ηη)2
,
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which implies that ̺(ηη)2 · µα < (αmax − 1)/αmax. The third transition holds because γαmax is
the positive root of (x+ 1)αmax−1 − xαmax = 0. The fourth transition holds because ̺(ηη)2 ≥ 1,
γαmax > 0 and αmax − 1 > 0.
Since µα <
αmax−1
αmax
· 1
̺(ηη)2
< 1
̺(ηη)2
, it can be inferred from Lemma 6.3 that gµα
(
̺ · (ηη)2 ·
γαmax
)
= maxx>0(x + 1)
αmax−1 − µα · x
αmax . It implies that λα satisfies the condition given in
Lemma 6.2. By Lemma 6.1, this theorem holds.
7 Bounded Potential Function
In this section, it is proved that the BGND game admits a potential function that is K-bounded
with K = ⌈αmax⌉.
Lemma 7.1 ([4]). If for every type profile t, there exists a function Φt : A 7→ R≥0 such that for
every action profile a ∈ At, every i ∈ [N ] and every a′i ∈ A
ti
i ,
Φt(a)− Φt(a
′
i, a−i) = Ci(ti; a)− Ci(ti; (a
′
i, a−i)) , (8)
then Φ(s) =
∑
t∈T p(t)Φt(s(t)) is a potential function of the BGND game.
Theorem 7.2. For the BGND game, there exists a potential function Φ(s) that is ⌈αmax⌉-
bounded.
Proof. For every type profile t and every action profile a ∈ At, define the function
Φt(a) =
∑
e∈E
lae∑
l=1
∑
j∈[q]
ξe,j · l
αj−1 .
In [29], it is proved that such a function satisfies Eq. (8), which implies that the BGND game
admits a potential function Φ(s) =
∑
t∈T p(t)Φt(s(t)). Furthermore, for every e ∈ E and every
j ∈ [q],
∑lae
l=1 l
αj−1 ≤ (lae )
αj trivially holds, and
lae∑
l=1
lαj−1 ≥
1
(lae )
⌈αj⌉−αj
lae∑
l=1
l⌈αj⌉−1 ≥
1
(lae)
⌈αj⌉−αj
·
1
⌈αj⌉
(lae )
⌈αj⌉ =
1
⌈αj⌉
(lae )
αj ,
where the second transition follows from [6]. Therefore, it can be obtained that Φt(a) ≤∑
e∈E Fe(l
a
e ) ≤ ⌈αmax⌉Φt(a). By the linearity of expectation, Φ(s) is ⌈αmax⌉-bounded.
8 Efficient Estimation of the Cost Share
This section focuses on the (η, η)-estimation of the expected cost shares. For any z ∈ (0, 1) and
z′ ≥ 1, define bz =
(
(β◦)2+1
)(
1− 1β◦
)−z
with β◦ being the unique root of 2β3−(z+2)β2−2 = 0
in the interval (1,+∞), Bz′ to be the fractional Bell number with the parameter z
′ [7, 28], and
γz′ to be the unique positive root of (x+ 1)
z′−1 = xz
′
[2]. For any i ∈ [N ], e ∈ E and any s−i,
it is shown that there exists a (max{1,maxαj∈(1,2) bαj−1}, max{maxαj≥2Bαj−1, 1})-estimation
f̂i,e(+; s−i) of fi,e(+; s−i) that can be obtained in poly(q,N, {|Ti|}i∈[N ])-time. Particularly, con-
sider the special case of the BGND game where q = 1 and α1 = 2, which means that the cost
function associated with each resource e ∈ E can be written as
Fe(l) = ξe · l
2 . (9)
It is proved that the BGND game with such a quadratic cost function is tractable.
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Lemma 8.1 ([9]). Let {X1,X2, · · · ,Xk, · · · } be a finite set of mutually independent random
variables following the Bernoulli distribution supported on {0, 1}. Then for any z ≥ 1,
E
[(∑
k
Xk
)z]
≤ Bz ·max
{
E
[∑
k
Xk
]
,
(
E
[∑
k
Xk
])z}
.
Lemma 8.2. Let {X1,X2, · · · ,Xk, · · · } be a finite set of Bernoulli random variables that are
mutually independent. For any z′ ∈ (0, 1) and β > 1:
1
β2 + 1
(
1−
1
β
)z′(
E
[
1 +
∑
k
Xk
])z′
≤ E
[(
1 +
∑
k
Xk
)z′]
≤
(
E
[
1 +
∑
k
Xk
])z′
.
Proof. The expression E
[(
1+
∑
kXk
)z′]
≤
(
E
[
1+
∑
kXk
])z′
follows from Jensen’s inequality
[26], since the function ϕ(x) = xz
′
is concave when z′ ∈ (0, 1). Now consider the lower bound
on E
[(
1+
∑
kXk
)z′]
. Let Var
[
1+
∑
kXk
]
be the variance of the random variable 1+
∑
kXk.
Then we have
Var
[
1 +
∑
k
Xk
]
= E
[(
1 +
∑
k
Xk
)2]
−
(
E
[
1 +
∑
k
Xk
])2
≤ B2 ·max
{
E
[
1 +
∑
k
Xk
]
,
(
E
[
1 +
∑
k
Xk
])2}
−
(
E
[
1 +
∑
k
Xk
])2
= 2 ·
(
E
[
1 +
∑
k
Xk
])2
−
(
E
[
1 +
∑
k
Xk
])2
=
(
E
[
1 +
∑
k
Xk
])2
.
The second transition above follows from Lemma 8.1, because {Xk} are mutually independent
Bernoulli random variables, and the constant 1 can also be viewed as a Bernoulli random variable
which equals to 1 with probability 1. The third transition holds because 1 +
∑
kXk ≥ 1. By
using Cantelli’s inequality [35], it can be obtained that for any β > 1,
Pr
[(
1 +
∑
k
Xk
)
<
(
1−
1
β
)
E
[
1 +
∑
k
Xk
]]
≤
1
1 +
(
E
[
1+
∑
kXk
])2
β2·Var
[
1+
∑
kXk
]
=
β2
β2 + 1
,
where Pr[·] denotes the probability of random events. Therefore,
E
[(
1 +
∑
k
Xk
)z′]
≥ Pr
[(
1 +
∑
k
Xk
)
≥
(
1−
1
β
)
E
[
1 +
∑
k
Xk
]]
·
[(
1−
1
β
)
E
[
1 +
∑
k
Xk
]]z′
≥
(
1−
β2
β2 + 1
)(
1−
1
β
)z′(
E
[
1 +
∑
k
Xk
])z′
.
Recalling that bz′ =
(
(β◦)2 + 1
)(
1 − 1β◦
)−z′
with β◦ being the unique root of 2β3 − (z +
2)β2 − 2 = 0 in the interval (1,+∞), we have the following lemma.
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Lemma 8.3. For any z′ ∈ (0, 1), bz′ = minβ>1(β
2 + 1)
(
1− 1β
)−z′
.
Proof. Let ϕ(β) = (β2 + 1)
(
1− 1β
)−z′
. Fix z′, the derivative of ϕ with respect to β is
dϕ
dβ
=
(
1−
1
β
)−z′−1 1
β2
(
2β3 − (2 + z′)β2 − 2
)
.
It can be further derived from the derivative that 2β3−(2+z′)β2−2 is monotonically increasing in
the interval (2+z
′
3 ,∞). Since
2+z′
3 < 1, 2β
3−(2+z′)β2−2 < 0 for β = 1, and 2β3−(2+z′)β2−2 >
0 for β = 2, there exists a unique β◦ ∈ (1,+∞) such that 2β3 − (2 + z′)β2 − 2 = 0, and β◦
minimizes (β2 + 1)
(
1− 1β
)−z′
because
(
1− 1β
)−z′−1
1
β2
> 0 for any β > 1.
For each action ai of player i and each resource e, denote the indicator of whether e is
contained in ai by δ(ai, e). Formally,
δ(ai, e) =
{
0 if e /∈ ai
1 otherwise
Theorem 8.4. For any player i, any edge e, any action ai, and any strategies s−i, let
f̂i,e(+; s−i) =
∑
j∈[q]
ξe,j
[
1 +
∑
i′ 6=i
∑
ti′∈Ti′
pi′(ti′)δ
(
si′(ti′), e
)]αj−1
, (10)
then
f̂i,e(+; s−i)/max
{
1, max
j:αj∈(1,2)
bαj−1
}
≤ fi,e(+; s−i) ≤ f̂i,e(+; s−i) ·
{
1, max
j:αj≥2
Bαj−1
}
. (11)
In particular, if for every resource e, Fe(l) is a quadratic function given in Eq. (9), then
f̂i,e(+; s−i) = fi,e(+; s−i).
Proof. Let ai be an action in Ai satisfying e ∈ ai. By definition, we have
fi,e(+; s−i) = Et−i∼p−i [fi,e(ai, s−i(t−i))]
=
∑
j∈[N ]
ξe,j · Et−i∼p−i
[(
l
ai,s−i(t−i)
e
)αj−1]
=
∑
j∈[N ]
ξe,j · Et−i∼p−i
1 + ∑
i′∈[N ]:i′ 6=i
δ(si′(t−i(i
′)), e)
αj−1
=
∑
j∈[N ]
ξe,jE{ti′∼pi′}i′ 6=i
1 +∑
i′ 6=i
δ(si′(ti′), e)
αj−1 .
The last transition holds because the prior distribution p is assumed to be a product distribution.
Now define a finite set of mutually independent Bernoulli random variables {Xi′,e(s)}i′ 6=i
such that each Xi′,e(s) takes the value 1 with probability
∑
ti′ :e∈si′(ti′ )
pi′(ti′). Fixing a player
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i′′ 6= i, we have
E{ti′∼pi′}i′ 6=i
1 +∑
i′ 6=i
δ(si′(ti′), e)
αj−1
=
∑
ti′′∈Ti′′
pi′′(ti′′)E{ti′∼pi′}i′ 6=i∧i′ 6=i′′
1 + δ(si′′(ti′′), e) + ∑
i′ 6=i∧i′ 6=i′′
δ(si′(ti′), e)
αj−1
=
∑
ti′′ :e∈si′′(ti′′ )
pi′′(ti′′)E{ti′∼pi′}i′ 6=i∧i′ 6=i′′
1 + 1 + ∑
i′ 6=i∧i′ 6=i′′
δ(si′(ti′), e)
αj−1
+
∑
ti′′ :e/∈si′′ (ti′′ )
pi′′(ti′′)E{ti′∼pi′}i′ 6=i∧i′ 6=i′′
1 + ∑
i′ 6=i∧i′ 6=i′′
δ(si′(ti′), e)
αj−1
= EXi′′,e(s)
E{ti′∼pi′}i′ 6=i∧i′ 6=i′′
1 +Xi′′,e(s) + ∑
i′ 6=i∧i′ 6=i′′
δ(si′(ti′), e)
αj−1 .
Therefore, it can be inductively proved that
E{ti′∼pi′}i′ 6=i
1 +∑
i′ 6=i
δ(si′(ti′), e)
αj−1 = E
1 +∑
i′ 6=i
Xi′,e(s)
αj−1 .
Recall that the constant 1 in the last expression above can also be viewed as a Bernoulli
random variable which equals to 1 with probability 1. For every αj ≥ 2, Lemma 8.1 can be
applied to obtain the following expression.
E
1 +∑
i′ 6=i
Xi′,e(s)
αj−1
≤ Bαj−1 ·max
E
1 +∑
i′ 6=i
Xi′,e(s)
 ,
E
1 +∑
i′ 6=i
Xi′,e(s)
αj−1
= Bαj−1 ·
E
1 +∑
i′ 6=i
Xi′,e(s)
αj−1 .
The second line holds because E
[
1 +
∑
i′ 6=iXi′,e(s)
]
> 1. Similarly, it can be derived from
Lemma 8.2 that for every αj ∈ (1, 2),
E
[(
1 +
∑
i′ 6=i
Xi′,e(s)
)αj−1]
≤
(
E
[
1 +
∑
i′ 6=i
Xi′,e(s)
])αj−1
,
which also trivially holds for αj = 1. So, E
[(
1 +
∑
i′ 6=iXi′,e(s)
)αj−1]
≤
max
{
1, maxj:αj≥2Bαj−1
}(
E
[
1 +
∑
i′ 6=iXi′,e(s)
])αj−1
, and in a similar way, it also be
inferred from Lemma 8.1 and Lemma 8.2 that E
[(
1 +
∑
i′ 6=iXi′,e(s)
)αj−1]
≥
(
E
[
1 +
21
∑
i′ 6=iXi′,e(s)
])αj−1/
max
{
1,maxj:αj<2 bαj−1
}
. Since E
[
1 +
∑
i′ 6=iXi′,e(s)
]
= 1 +∑
i′ 6=i
∑
ti′
pi′(ti′)δ
(
si′(ti′), e
)
, Eq. (11) holds. For the special case where every Fe is a quadratic
function, by the linearity of the expectation, we have
E{ti′∼pi′}i′ 6=i
[(
1 +
∑
i′ 6=i
δ(si′(ti′), e)
)2−1]
= 1 +
∑
i′ 6=i
Eti′∼pi′
[
δ(si′(ti′), e)
]
,
which completes the proof.
Corollary 8.5. By computing Eq. (10), the desired estimation of each expected cost share is
obtained in O(q ·
∑
i∈[N ] |Ti|)-time.
Plugging Theorem 6.5, Theorem 7.2, Theorem 8.4, and Corollary 8.5 into Theorem 5.6 proves
our main result, Theorem 1.2.
22
References
[1] Ajit Agrawal, Philip Klein, and R. Ravi. When trees collide: An approximation algorithm
for the generalized steiner problem on networks. SIAM Journal on Computing, 24(3):440–
456, 1995.
[2] Sebastian Aland, Dominic Dumrauf, Martin Gairing, Burkhard Monien, and Florian
Schoppmann. Exact price of anarchy for polynomial congestion games. In Annual Sympo-
sium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, pages 218–229. Springer, 2006.
[3] Susanne Albers. Energy-efficient algorithms. Commun. ACM, 53(5):86–96, 2010.
[4] Noga Alon, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, and Moshe Tennenholtz. Bayesian ignorance.
Theoretical Computer Science, 452:1–11, 2012. Preliminary version appears in Proceedings
of the 29th ACM SIGACT-SIGOPS Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing,
pp. 384-391. ACM, 2010.
[5] Matthew Andrews, Antonio Ferna´ndez Anta, Lisa Zhang, and Wenbo Zhao. Routing for
power minimization in the speed scaling model. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking,
20(1):285 –294, feb. 2012.
[6] Elliot Anshelevich, Anirban Dasgupta, Jon Kleinberg, Eva Tardos, Tom Wexler, and Tim
Roughgarden. The price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation. SIAM
Journal on Computing, 38(4):1602–1623, 2008. Preliminary version appears in Proceedings
of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2004.
[7] Evripidis Bampis, Alexander Kononov, Dimitrios Letsios, Giorgio Lucarelli, and Maxim
Sviridenko. Energy efficient scheduling and routing via randomized rounding. In 33nd
International Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer
Science, page 449, 2013.
[8] Nikhil Bansal, Tracy Kimbrel, and Kirk Pruhs. Speed scaling to manage energy and tem-
perature. J. ACM, 54(1):3:1–3:39, 2007.
[9] Daniel Berend and Tamir Tassa. Improved bounds on bell numbers and on moments of
sums of random variables. Probability and Mathematical Statistics, 30(2):185–205, 2010.
[10] Jaros law Byrka, Fabrizio Grandoni, Thomas Rothvoss, and Laura Sanita`. Steiner tree
approximation via iterative randomized rounding. Journal of the ACM (JACM), 60(1):6,
2013. Preliminary version in STOC’10.
[11] Moses Charikar, Chandra Chekuri, To-yat Cheung, Zuo Dai, Ashish Goel, Sudipto Guha,
and Ming Li. Approximation algorithms for directed steiner problems. In Proceedings of
the Ninth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pages 192–200, 1998.
[12] Chandra Chekuri, Guy Even, Anupam Gupta, and Danny Segev. Set connectivity problems
in undirected graphs and the directed steiner network problem. ACM Trans. Algorithms,
7(2):18:1–18:17, 2011.
[13] Ken Christensen, Pedro Reviriego, Bruce Nordman, Michael Bennett, Mehrgan Mostowfi,
and Juan Antonio Maestro. Ieee 802.3 az: the road to energy efficient ethernet. IEEE
Communications Magazine, 48(11), 2010.
[14] Teodor Gabriel Crainic, Xiaorui Fu, Michel Gendreau, Walter Rei, and Stein W Wal-
lace. Progressive hedging-based metaheuristics for stochastic network design. Networks,
58(2):114–124, 2011.
23
[15] E. W. Dijkstra. A note on two problems in connexion with graphs. Numer. Math., 1(1):269–
271, 1959.
[16] Yuval Emek, Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, and Yangguang Shi. Approximating generalized
network design under (dis)economies of scale with applications to energy efficiency. In
Proceedings of the 50th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC
2018, pages 598–606, New York, NY, USA, 2018. ACM.
[17] Matthias Englert and Harald Ra¨cke. Oblivious routing for the lp-norm. In Proceedings of
the 2009 50th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS ’09,
pages 32–40, Washington, DC, USA, 2009. IEEE Computer Society.
[18] Matthias Englert and Harald Ra¨cke. Oblivious routing for the lp-norm. In Foundations of
Computer Science, 2009. FOCS’09. 50th Annual IEEE Symposium on, pages 32–40. IEEE,
2009.
[19] Michael L. Fredman and Robert Endre Tarjan. Fibonacci heaps and their uses in improved
network optimization algorithms. J. ACM, 34(3):596–615, 1987.
[20] Naveen Garg, Anupam Gupta, Stefano Leonardi, and Piotr Sankowski. Stochastic analyses
for online combinatorial optimization problems. In Proceedings of the Nineteenth Annual
ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA ’08, pages 942–951. Society for
Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 2008.
[21] Anupam Gupta, Mohammad T Hajiaghayi, and Harald Ra¨cke. Oblivious network design.
In Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm,
pages 970–979. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 2006.
[22] Anupam Gupta, R Ravi, and Amitabh Sinha. An edge in time saves nine: Lp rounding
approximation algorithms for stochastic network design. In FOCS, pages 218–227, 2004.
[23] Prahladh Harsha, Thomas P. Hayes, Hariharan Narayanan, Harald Ra¨cke, and Jaikumar
Radhakrishnan. Minimizing average latency in oblivious routing. In Proceedings of the
Nineteenth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA ’08, pages 200–
207, Philadelphia, PA, USA, 2008. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics.
[24] Intel. Enhanced intel speedstep technology for the intel pentium m processor. In Intel
White Paper 301170-001, 2004.
[25] Sandy Irani and Kirk R. Pruhs. Algorithmic problems in power management. SIGACT
News, 36(2):63–76, 2005.
[26] J.L.W.V. Jensen. Sur les fonctions convexes et les ine´galite´s entre les valeurs moyennes.
Acta Mathematica, 30(1):175–193, 1906.
[27] Gregory Lawler and Hariharan Narayanan. Mixing times and &ell;p bounds for oblivi-
ous routing. In Proceedings of the Meeting on Analytic Algorithmics and Combinatorics,
ANALCO ’09, pages 66–74, Philadelphia, PA, USA, 2009. Society for Industrial and Ap-
plied Mathematics.
[28] Konstantin Makarychev and Maxim Sviridenko. Solving optimization problems with dis-
economies of scale via decoupling. In 55th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of
Computer Science, FOCS, 2014.
[29] Dov Monderer and Lloyd S Shapley. Potential games. Games and economic behavior,
14(1):124–143, 1996.
24
[30] Sergiu Nedevschi, Lucian Popa, Gianluca Iannaccone, Sylvia Ratnasamy, and David
Wetherall. Reducing network energy consumption via sleeping and rate-adaptation. In
Proceedings of the 5th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implemen-
tation, NSDI’08, pages 323–336. USENIX Association, 2008.
[31] Harald Ra¨cke. Survey on oblivious routing strategies. In Mathematical Theory and Com-
putational Practice, volume 5635 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 419–429.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009.
[32] Ragheb Rahmaniani, Teodor Gabriel Crainic, Michel Gendreau, and Walter Rei. Accelerat-
ing the benders decomposition method: Application to stochastic network design problems.
SIAM Journal on Optimization, 28(1):875–903, 2018.
[33] Tim Roughgarden. The price of anarchy in games of incomplete information. In Proceedings
of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 862–879. ACM, 2012.
[34] Tim Roughgarden. Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy. Journal of the ACM
(JACM), 62(5):32, 2015. Preliminary version in STOC’09.
[35] I Richard Savage. Probability inequalities of the tchebycheff type. Journal of Research of the
National Bureau of Standards-B. Mathematics and Mathematical Physics B, 65(3):211–222,
1961.
[36] Yangguang Shi, Fa Zhang, Jie Wu, and Zhiyong Liu. Randomized oblivious integral routing
for minimizing power cost. Theoretical Computer Science, 607:221–246, 2015.
[37] AdamWierman, Lachlan LH Andrew, and Ao Tang. Power-aware speed scaling in processor
sharing systems. In 28th IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications,
Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies, INFOCOM, pages
2007 –2015, april 2009.
[38] F. Yao, A. Demers, and S. Shenker. A scheduling model for reduced cpu energy. In
Proceedings of IEEE 36th Annual Foundations of Computer Science, pages 374–382, 1995.
25
